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There is considerable angst today about the US trade deficit and challenges to the US position centers on 
China. It is notable that many of these issues echo concerns about Japan in the early 1980s. An analytic 
review of US negotiations with Japan during the critical period from January 1981 through the Plaza 
Accord in September 1985 offers a useful reminder of unintended consequences, and of how events can 
evolve within a context of both micro decisions and larger political and economic forces. This is an 








In the midst of the Cold War during the early 1980s no one in the US government or business community 
was as concerned with trade issues related to China or Russia as they are today. Rather the focus was on 
one country: Japan. Many feared it would replace the US as the global economic hegemon, as Ezra 
Vogel’s book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (1979) suggested. 
 Japanese Banks were the world’s biggest, Japanese auto producers were gaining share both 
globally and in the United States, and Komatsu was successfully challenging Caterpillar for global mining 
and construction projects. Cartoons depicted US CEOs dressed in samurai garb and translations of 
Miyamoto Musashi’s 1644 The Book of Five Rings sold like wildfire. (Generally accepted as Japan’s 
greatest swordsman, his book is considered a brilliant discussion of strategy.)  
 Companies, unions, and politicians put pressure on the US government to do something about 
Japanese competition and the large trade deficit with Japan. Unfortunately, as often happens in the real 
world, their actions exacerbated the problem. Under pressures to open the Japanese economy to US 
investors and to appreciate the yen, the Japanese government liberalized the capital controls that had been 
in place since the end of World War II. But rather than become stronger, the yen remained weak during 
1980-85, elevating trade tensions and increasing the bilateral trade deficit with Japan to historic levels. 
This then became the Eye of the Storm.  
 Many of the issues raised during this period have echoes today in US trade concerns with China: 
an undervalued currency, restrictions on capital flows, and the use of bureaucratic tactics to favor local 
suppliers or support uncompetitive firms.  
 Thus, an analytic review of US negotiations with Japan during the period from January 1981 
through the Plaza Accord in September 1985 offers a useful reminder on how events can evolve within a 
context of both micro decisions and larger political and economic forces. Trade negotiations inevitably 
are subject to wider forces of diplomacy and national interest than they are either to the principals of free 
trade or to concepts of competitive and comparative advantage. Further, they often have unintended 
consequences. 
 This is an insider’s perspective, as the author was the Commercial Counselor in the US Embassy 
in Tokyo between 1983 and 1985 and was involved in virtually all aspects of US-Japan trade and business 
relations during this period. The focus is on the intended and unintended consequences arising from the 
intersection of politics, economics, and diplomacy with such trade and business related activities 
including situations involving industrial espionage and cold war priorities. 
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 The core of the paper is a set of summaries of specific cases that provide examples of the various 
issues. These are organized by the general issue to which they relate. An Appendix presents an overview 
of the general issues still being contested in the mid 80s when my time as Commercial Counselor ended. 
¿1 
 
Implementation of the 1980 Foreign Exchange Law  
 
A new foreign exchange law (known officially as the Law Partially Revising the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law) was implemented in December 1980. It changed the basic principle behind 
foreign exchange control from that of “prohibition of foreign transactions with exceptions” to “freedom of 
transactions with exceptions”. Under the new law, Japanese residents could buy and sell foreign currency 
assets freely as long as they were dealing with authorized foreign exchange banks and designated 
securities companies as their counter-parties. However, direct foreign currency transactions among 
residents and direct financial transactions between residents and non-residents were restricted. (This 
section draws on Fukao 2015.) 
 Under this law, foreign currency deposits and foreign currency borrowings with authorized 
foreign exchange banks became completely free. In addition, the interest rates on foreign currency 
deposits were exempted from the upper limits of the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law and 
therefore were free interest rates. Controls on capital transactions could be implemented in certain 
emergency situations, but controls have never been invoked under the emergency provisions.  
 The new law enabled residents to freely hold foreign assets and liabilities. This was a 
fundamental change in exchange controls and was effectively an abolition of virtually all restrictions on 
the convertibility of the yen. And because the yen became almost fully convertible, non-resident free yen 
deposits came to be known simply as non-resident yen deposits. 
 The result was not the intended strengthening of the yen but a further weakening as Japanese 
insurance companies in particular bought US government securities in huge volumes given the 
historically high interest rates in the US due to the Volcker Squeeze. (For example, 13-week Treasury 
bills reached 15 percent in August 1981.) The effect was to increase the demand for dollars and weaken 
the yen, yielding a foreign exchange gain in addition to a high yield, leading to even more demand for US 
assets. This demand persisted even after US rates began falling in August 1983 as Japanese insurance 
companies realized large capital gains on their US bond portfolios. It was only after the Plaza Accord in 
                                                 
1 Some of the material is covered in Rapp (1999). Rapp (1986) covers several trade barriers in great detail, so 
they are not repeated here. 
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September 1985, when the world’s central banks coordinated their efforts to weaken the dollar, that the 





Trade-Related Tensions And The Yen 
 
While not all commercially related diplomatic issues involving US-Japan relations between 1980 and 
1985 were due to the weak yen, many were. Further, even those that were not directly affected were 
certainly influenced by it when US firms that could be competitive despite a weak yen were frustrated in 
selling their products in Japan or that wished to use a strong dollar to invest in Japan but were prevented 
from doing so. 2 
 The hot commercial issues that related directly to a strong dollar include the voluntary auto 
export quotas, the coking coal controversy, Corning’s fiber optic cable sales and patents, integrated circuit 




The most visible and controversial of these situations were the “voluntary” export restraints on cars 
whereby, to get around its trade treaties with Japan, the US government compelled the Japanese 
government and auto producers to limit cars exported to the United States. 3  
                                                 
2  During this period, Japan imported much fewer manufactured goods than other developed countries. 
Saxonhouse (1983) analyzed this and concluded that econometrically this import pattern could be explained by the 
apparent structure of Japan's economy. However, if there are obstacles to trade in certain goods with large internal 
markets where imports would increase in the absence of these obstacles, the relevant reality that must be addressed 
is these obstacles and not the question of comparative statistics. 3 When the US automobile industry was threatened by popular, cheaper, and more fuel efficient Japanese 
cars, a 1981 “voluntary restraint” agreement limited Japan to 1.68 million cars annually, a level set by the US 
government. Intended to expire in April 1984, it was extended, albeit with higher limits because of the large trade 
deficit with Japan and pressure from domestic manufacturers. The restraint was removed only in 1994. 
 Although gasoline prices had declined from the 1970s, fuel efficiency remained an important factor in 
many car buyers’ decisions. 
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 Initially the Japanese responded by shipping fully equipped cars at a still-lower price than their 
US counterparts. This strategy not only maximized Japanese revenues per car sold, it undercut the 
profitable dealer and producer add-ons that were a common US car sales ploy at the time. This, in turn, 
revolutionized the US marketing of cars.  
 Export quotas were based on existing market shares, leading Honda, with a relatively low quota, 
to open a US plant. It was located next to a motorcycle plant in Ohio built to get around quotas on 
motorcycle imports that the US had imposed to rescue Harley-Davidson. (Klein (1984) discusses the 
motorcycle case. 
 Because Japanese producers could charge premium prices for their fully equipped, high-quality, 
fuel-efficient cars, they and their dealers prospered. Japanese producers used the windfall to develop high-
end cars such as the Lexus, Acura, and Infinity, successfully penetrating a market the US thought it had to 
itself. After 1985 and the Plaza Accord when the yen had strengthened appreciably, these producers also 
had the cash and market position to follow Honda and establish large, efficient US assembly and engine 
plants primarily in right-to-work states such as Kentucky and Tennessee.  
 The FCS (US Department Of Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service) in Tokyo advised US 
policy makers and representatives of US auto firms in Japan of this likely outcome. However, the firms 
were focused on the present and their desire to protect eroding US sales, so they pushed hard politically 
through their Congressional delegations and lobbyists in Washington for the export quotas and their 
extension. Countering this were the vigorous activities by US state representatives working to attract 
Japanese auto plants. This included missions led by governors bringing promises of tax holidays and 
other subsidies. The Commercial Counselor held bi-weekly meetings for the representatives and was able 
to gauge the increasing excitement and competition for these Japanese investments. 
 Further, US auto CEOs were misguided on several levels with respect to the competitive and 
political impacts of the quotas and the US plant investments. Despite the cash flow benefits and state 
subsidies to their Japanese competitors, the US industry thought that when the Japanese firms set up US 
operations, it would create a level playing field in terms of wages, benefits, and productivity. However 
Japanese producers avoided this, hiring a younger work force, which meant lower medical and pension 
costs. In addition, the Japanese firms built plants that were more efficient, and helped their key Japanese 
suppliers establish adjacent facilities that were also more up-to-date and efficient than most US 
counterparts. Perhaps most importantly, these investments also helped the Japanese producers to establish 
expansive political connections that could act as a counterweight to the Detroit and Michigan delegations. 
This strategy has been continued by both Japanese and European auto producers as they have expanded 
investments throughout the South. 
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Coking Coal 
 
In the early 1980s the Japan’s steel industry was considered the world’s most efficient, which of course 
was a great boon to both its auto and shipbuilding industries. Indeed these industries were highly 
synergistic in that larger ships reduced raw material costs while lower-cost steel reduced the cost of ships 
and the cost of transporting raw materials. In addition, the development of dedicated car carriers in the 
1970s reduced the cost of shipping cars from Japan to the West or East coast of the US below what it cost 
Detroit to access those markets by truck or rail. 
 However, Japanese steel producers had no domestic raw material inputs and therefore US coking 
coal exports to Japan were an extremely important market to an industry that had seen local US coking 
coal demand decline due to rising Japanese steel imports. Indeed Japan was the US coking coal industry’s 
largest export market. However, due to the strong US dollar, it was losing sales to Australian producers, 
who also had a shorter shipping route. Nevertheless, given its higher BTU levels, US coking coal 
remained an important input for Japanese steel producers. Further, these producers were very conscious of 
their direct and indirect position in the US steel market. The question was then how to raise coal’s 
visibility within the overall US-Japan relationship. 
 An opportunity to address this arose during the 1984 visit of William E Brock, the US Trade 
Representative. As a former Senator from Tennessee, a very important coking coal mining and exporting 
state, coking coal exports to Japan were an area where he had local knowledge and expertise. Having 
been briefed as he came from the airport for meetings with top Japanese officials, he took to the subject of 
coking coal imports like a duck to water. The headlines in the Japanese press the next day loosely 
translated were “Brock Blasts Japanese On Coking Coal!”. In turn, the US Coal Association was very 




Due to the liberalization of the yen, Japanese tourists were no longer limited in how much money they 
could take out of Japan. The US and Japanese governments saw tourism as a way to reduce trade tensions, 
and the US tourist industry saw a huge market opportunity, particularly in Hawaii. However, the strong 
dollar made other destinations more attractive. To promote tourism, visa applications were facilitated and 
the two governments worked to have Japanese tourists pay more of their visits’ costs in yen in Japan such 
as airfares and local tours. 
 Large Japanese travel companies such as JTB set up operations in Hawaii and the basic strategy 
actually did work, as Japanese tourism to US destinations increased. But, there were some unexpected 
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results. Local US tour operators complained they were cut out. And, because Japan is a cash-using 
society, Japanese tourists tended to carry large amounts of money and became attractive targets for 
scammers, pickpockets, and muggers. To counter this, consulates began a program to encourage using 
travelers checks instead of cash, giving flyers in Japanese from American Express and Citibank at the US 
Consulates when Japanese tourists applied for visas. This brought complaints from Japanese banks that 
they were being discriminated against, an issue that was finally resolved by also distributing brochures 




Unfortunately not all trade disputes were so easily resolved. Due to Japan’s industrial policy after World 
War II, the Japanese government felt responsibility toward industries it had promoted but which were no 
longer competitive. This is similar to China’s current treatment of its inefficient state-owned enterprises. 
Depressed industries included more than 20 officially designated industries, over half of whose operating 
costs were related to energy and natural resources, that had become uncompetitive due to the dramatic 
rise in oil prices during the 1970s. (Many studies detail Japan’s industrial policy in relation to trade. See 
Appendix reports 1 and 4, as well as Rapp (1975, 1977).) 
 These included aluminum smelting, chemical fertilizers, caustic soda, various petrochemicals, 
lumber, plywood, electric furnaces, and paper. Some (including fabricated aluminum, paper, plywood, 
and lumber) were protected from a large increase in imports through high tariffs. Others such as chemical 
fertilizers were import-resistant due to various legal arrangements or industry collusion. The collusion 
approach included industry safeguards for soda ash, synthetic rubber, and caustic soda firms. The total 
Japanese market at the time for such products exceeded $80 billion, yet with the exception of aluminum-
ingot and electric-furnace products, import penetration was surprisingly low, less than 7 percent. 
 Historically, the whole purpose of industrial policy had been to move up the value-added chain by 
promoting the restructuring of Japan's economy and industry toward more sophisticated, higher-
technology products, substituting government action for market forces when the latter did not seem to be 
doing the job. (This is the so-called “flying geese” model of development put forward by Kaname 
Akamatsu in the 1930s.) These actions had been particularly successful in steel, shipbuilding, and 
automobiles. However, the protection of uncompetitive depressed industries that had been "favored 
children" was a new situation and trade issue. It reflected their size and political influence, as well as the 
slowdown in the Japanese economy during the 1980s as Japan’s export-led growth model slowed. When 
growth is slow it makes it more difficult to transfer resources to emerging sectors. 
 Still, the Japanese government realized that protecting these industries directly through tariffs or 
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quotas was risky in terms of trade relations, and could justify other countries protecting their declining 
industries in ways that hurt Japan’s successful export industries. The government thus struck on the idea 
of giving trade associations or other organizations control over the import and distribution of competitive 
imports such as fertilizer. Zennoh, the Association of Agricultural Cooperatives, was an excellent 
illustration of this tactic.  
 As described in detail in Rapp (1986), Zennoh was the exclusive distributor of chemical fertilizer 
to Japanese farmers. It could thus import at very low global prices and then mark them up substantially, 
using the profits to subsidize its own inefficient production. The Japanese consumer picked up the cost in 
higher food prices. Rice, for instance, was almost seven times the world price. Such high food prices were 
supported through agricultural quotas that fell outside most trade agreements.  
 In the case of soda ash used in glass making, the US was able to counter a monopsony by the 
Japan’s Soda Ash Association by setting up a monopoly exporter, ANSAC. ANSAC undertook a 
campaign to explain to Japanese users such as flat-glass manufacturers the benefits of improved access to 
US soda ash. 4 
 While soda ash was a partial success, little headway was made in opening other depressed 
industries to more imports. Japanese business, political, and bureaucratic resistance was always very great 
and therefore each situation took enormous negotiating time and research effort. Thus these highly 
protected industries only seriously began to disappear as their labor forces aged and as Japanese industry 
expanded its overseas investment in these industries during the strong yen period that followed the Plaza 
Accord. One spectacular example of this shift was the dismantling of an entire aluminum production 
facility in Japan and its reconstruction in Venezuela near a very low-cost hydroelectric facility. 
 
Disputes Over Standards 
 
Aluminum Baseball Bats 
 
In May 1983 changes were made in 16 Japanese laws affecting standards and certification, representing 
an admission by the government of Japan of how various bureaucratic and industry procedures 
represented large barriers to trade, violating its international agreements. The US Department of 
                                                 
4 ANSAC (American Natural Soda Ash Corp) was organized in 1984 with the encouragement of the US 
Commerce Dept under the Export Trade Act of 1918 (15 USC §61-66), which is more commonly known as the 
Webb-Pomerene Act. The act grants qualifying export associations a limited immunity from antitrust prosecution. 
Entities established under Webb-Pomerene are overseen by the Federal Trace Commission (FTC). 
http://www.ansac.com/about-ansac/company-profile/  
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Commerce estimated that more than $5 billion in annual trade was affected. The change was stimulated 
not by a large, critically important depressed industry. Rather, it involved the importing of aluminum 
baseball bats.  
 Following a series of injuries resulting from defective metal bats in 1975, none of which were 
made in America, all metal baseball and softball bats were designated "specified products" under Japan's 
Consumer Product Safety Law. Thereafter, all metal bats sold in Japan would need to have the "S-mark" 
labels that certified its product safety. The Japan Softball League (JSBB) also established standards for a 
"JSBB-mark" for metal bats used in its league games. Although the JSBB standards were in fact based on 
the US product, US metal bat manufacturers were refused certification by the JSBB when they requested 
it in 1980. Thus by the fall of 1981 the US government was negotiating intensively with Japan to resolve 
the issue. A second package of market-opening measures, announced on May 28, 1982, contained a 
provision stating that any metal bat receiving an S-mark would also receive the JSBB-mark. 
 Yet this was not the end of the issue because only Japanese producers were allowed factory 
certification due to the unavailability of Japanese inspectors. US exports were inspected in batches upon 
import, which was both expensive and time consuming. In response the US argued these procedures 
violated GATT agreements. The issue was not resolved until the US began a formal dispute resolution 
process.  
 In response to pressure for change from the US and other countries, the Japanese government set 
up a special cabinet-level committee. The Gotoda Commission, under then Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Masaharu Gotoda would determine the changes required to bring Japan into compliance and resolve some 
of the standards-related disputes. The findings and recommendations essentially concurred with the US 




One standard that continued to be in dispute was tire valves. Even though Scovill Manufacturing had 
invented the tire valve and had established the world standard accepted in virtually every country, Japan 
had a different standard that kept out US valves. Needless to say, given the auto dispute and the number 
of Japanese-produced cars coming into the US with five tires and five valves plus the large number of 
Japanese cars and tires being sold locally or exported elsewhere, this was a topic of concern. Further, 
there was an unexpected political dimension when Ronald Regan was elected president in 1980 and 
appointed Malcolm Baldrige as Secretary of Commerce.  
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 Baldrige was a past CEO of Scovill and a scion of the founding family. Thus, ahead of a high-
level trade mission to Japan led by Baldrige, the Japanese government lifted import restrictions regarding 
tire valves if they met the international standard, thus accepting imports from the US.  
 On the day Baldrige arrived with his delegation of top US business executives, headlines in the 
Japanese press declared that a taxi fleet in Osaka using 250 tires with recently imported US-made valves 
had all failed. This was so obviously staged that it became a major embarrassment to the Japanese 
government. Major Japanese tire manufacturers began using US valves in volume, especially on exports 




The leading producer of fire hose worldwide is a company called American Lafrance. Given Lafrance’s 
global scale, the leading Japanese producer was totally uncompetitive. Further the market prospects 
seemed quite promising, given the developing Japanese construction boom. However, Japanese fire code 
regulations were quite complex, including the color-coding of fire hoses for different types of buildings 
and uses. More importantly, the Japanese producer was family owned and one of the family members was 
a Diet member. In addition, he was on the Diet’s construction and building committee and chair of the 
subcommittee that established fire code regulations. This was an intersection of politics and business 
interests that could not be overcome. Thus American LaFrance’s attempt to enter the country via a joint 
venture lapsed and Japanese buildings and their tenants continued to bear the higher cost. 
 
Patent Controversies: Corning 
 
Corning was the inventor and developer of the fiber-optic technology that has revolutionized 
telecommunications. Unfortunately the Japanese patent office tied up its application for years and allowed 
Asahi Glass and Nippon Glass to capture the Japanese market despite multiple US protests and heavy 
diplomatic pressures. This disagreement finally came to head when the Corning-Siemens joint venture 
that manufactured fiber optic cable was trying to penetrate the Japanese telecommunications market at the 
same time that Asahi Glass wanted to open a plant in North Carolina to compete for US business, 
leveraging the advantages of a weak yen and arguing that Corning’s basic US patent had expired.  
 The US countered that Corning’s cable manufacturing and technology patents were still valid and 
sought to prevent Asahi’s investment through a complaint to the US International Trade Commission 
(ITC) regarding the equipment and technology that Asahi would need to import from Japan. In addition, it 
linked any resolution of the issue to the granting of Corning’s Japanese patents, the payment of past 
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royalties, and the opening of Japan’s telecommunications market to US trade and investment as discussed 






During the 1980s senatorial influence carried sway not only on issues where an important industry was 
involved, but also where local politics and a single company was the consideration. Baxter-Travenol, 
headquartered in Illinois, had developed a new portable method for continuous kidney dialysis involving 
a catheter and a replaceable portable pouch that was not only more convenient for patients than weekly 
trips to a hospital for a machine-based treatment, but also much less expensive. After a lengthy series of 
medical trials in cooperation with doctors at some Japanese university hospitals and considerable pressure 
from the US embassy, including Ambassador Mike Mansfield’s direct intervention with Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone, the Japanese Ministry of Health approved the product for widespread use.  
 This appeared to be a major market opening victory, as well as a victory for Japanese patients, as 
machine dialysis represented almost 30% of Japan’s national health budget. However it also was a huge 
cash flow for major textile firms such as Toray and Teijin that made the replaceable filters used in the 
dialysis machines. Machine dialysis was also a big money earner for many hospitals and doctors. Indeed, 
some hospitals had invested enormously to expand their treatment facilities. Needless to say these 
economically and politically powerful groups were not happy about having their investments in expensive 
machines and related facilities less used. Thus, the initial victory proved short-lived. 
 Under Japan’s single payer national health system, getting your medical product or drug approved 
is a critical first step. However, to make money you also need reimbursement by the system. Normally if 
a treatment or drug represents an innovation, is a clear patient benefit, and is cost saving, the Ministry will 
set a reimbursement rate that compensates the supplier for this and encourages doctors to use the 
treatment or prescribe the drug for a period of years to encourage such innovations and improvements in 
medical outcomes.  
 In this case, though, the Ministry set a rate that effectively created a level playing field 
economically between the machine-based systems and Baxter-Travenol. Thus, there was no financial 
incentive for doctors to switch to the Baxter-Travenol system. It seemed the industry and the vested 
interests had won after all. But 1984 was a presidential election year and Charles H Percy was in a tough 
re-election battle for his Illinois senate seat. Percy came to Japan to meet with his old senate colleague, 
Ambassador Mike Mansfield. Because Mansfield believed he had solved this issue in direct negotiations 
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with Nakasone, on hearing of the Japanese ploy, he became visibly upset and arranged for an immediate 
meeting with the Prime Minister. That afternoon the Commercial Counselor and his industry specialist 
had a meeting with a Deputy Director at Japan’s Ministry of Health that ultimately led to a successful 
resolution of the reimbursement issue. While this result benefitted Baxter-Travenol and many Japanese 




The vitamin market in Japan was and is an extremely large market as Japanese have historically been 
obsessed with health and fitness. Some observers have even considered Japan to be a nation of 
hypochondriacs. During this period, the vitamin market was highly protected. The government did this by 
classifying vitamins as pharmaceutical products similar to medicines that required Japanese medical 
trials, a very lengthy and expensive process. This situation allowed Japanese producers, and especially 
Takeda, which had a roughly 60 percent market share, to charge premium prices relative to the world 
market, where generally vitamins are considered food supplements and a supplier only has to show they 
met certain quality and chemical composition requirements. 
 Hoechst, the German chemical company and a dominant player in the world vitamin market, saw 
Japan as a market opportunity but needed diplomatic and political pressure to break through the strong 
connections between Takeda and the Ministry of Health. (Many ex-ministry officials occupied important 
positions at Takeda, as was typical of other Japanese firms and industries such as autos (MITI, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry), steel (MITI), and banking (Ministry of Finance).) Hoechst 
is a German company and thus went to EU trade negotiators. However the EU had other trade and 
foreign-direct-investment priorities and declined to help, instead suggesting Hoechst approach the US. 
Did it make sense for a German company? The answer turned out to be yes.  
 First, the US was very interested in bureaucratic barriers that violated GATT requirements. 
Second, one of the Tokyo Commercial Section’s mandates was to promote and expand US exports to 
Japan. Since Hoechst intended to ship the vitamins to Japan from its plant in New Jersey, it met this key 
consideration. The Ministry of Health was therefore very surprised when the Embassy requested a 
meeting on the vitamin issue and arrived with the local Hoechst representative. After taking an approach 
similar to the baseball bat controversy by indicating the US was prepared to file a complaint under GATT 
with respect to an unwarranted standard being applied to imported vitamins, the Japanese government 
agreed to a quality testing regime under which Hoechst gained access to the market for its imported 
products. Takeda immediately lowered prices to meet the competition. Still, the Japanese consumer 
definitely benefited. 




Access for US suppliers and contractors to Japanese government and government-owned company 
projects revolved around the application of OECD and GATT agreements on government procurement to 
which Japan was a party.  
 Japan generally conformed to the letter of the GATT code in establishing transparent procedures. 
However, it almost exclusively used sole-source tendering (which was originally intended for exceptional 
circumstances), effectively undermining the code's intent. Further, a very short 30-day notice period 
permitted little time for translation and bid response. 
 An important illustration of both the opportunities and frustrations experienced in this regard was 
the Japanese telecommunications sector as it moved from analog to digital technology. Japanese suppliers 
expected that the high prices paid by NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, the telephone monopoly) 
and other Japanese customers for domestic equipment as opposed to imports would fund the suppliers’ 
technology and product development.  
 Telecommunications was typical of many Japanese industries in that, for many years, the 
government worked closely with leading firms in a sector to promote the industry’s development and 
competitiveness. Indeed, it is the accepted way of doing things in Japan. Close personal relationships in 
the pursuit of common objectives are naturally developed. This was facilitated by the fact ex-bureaucrats 
(particularly from MITI and NTT) as noted above populated the higher ranks of the companies with 
which the ministry and phone company had dealt. The leading suppliers were Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC. 
Both foreign firms and domestic newcomers such as Sony were excluded. 
 Though value-added networks (VANs, which are private telecommunication systems using leased 
lines over which special, custom services are offered), telecom-related software, and satellites each 
involve distinct negotiation problems with different ministries, products, barriers, and negotiation forums, 
they were all part of an important and complex interaction involving industrial policy, inter-ministry 
competition, and long-term national strategic objectives with respect to the digitalization of global 
telecommunications. Thus they were all very visible at the highest levels of business and government on 
both sides of the Pacific. They represented the industries of the future where each country expected to 
play a significant leading role (Rapp 1984).  
 As explained in Rapp (1986), in joint industrial policy forums with the United States at that time, 
the Japanese government maintained it no longer practiced industrial policies that restricted imports or 
investment in order to promote domestic industries. Further, it maintained it no longer interfered with the 
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technology transfers by foreign firms into Japan. Any such policies had been eliminated in the mid-1970s 
as part of its OECD obligations. 
 But just after receiving these open-market representations, the US found active proposals by the 
Japanese government to restrict to 50 percent the foreign ownership of VANs. Similarly, the government 
refused to purchase US or European communications equipment or satellites, ostensibly to protect 
domestic space science, but in reality to protect a very uncompetitive space-launch capability.  
 Finally, MITI tried to set up a new software protection system other than copyright where MITI 
could have compelled the transfer of US software technology to Japanese firms on terms and conditions 
determined by MITI. The actually stated rationale was to help Japanese firms catch up with the United 
States in the area of software development, which was a US competitive strength. 
 The US government and industry reacted very strongly, with some success. The proposed 
foreign-ownership restriction was finally eliminated in the VAN legislation. But several onerous proposed 
regulatory provisions remained, especially for firms offering international VAN services. These concerns 
were still being hotly negotiated in March 1985, more than a year after the initial discussions began and 
right up to the promulgation of the new regulations.  
 In conjunction with Japan's Ministry of Education (which oversaw copyrights), the US was able 
to persuade MITI to withdraw its proposed software bill. In addition, the purchase of communication 
satellites by private entities was liberalized as of April 1985. However, other kinds of satellites remained 
restricted, and NTT had to continue funding Japan’s space satellite programs, reducing its incentive to 
switch to US purchases. There was further need, as well, for approving an additional band for satellite 
usage to facilitate the purchase of US communication satellites.  
 High-technology trade issues thus remained far from full resolution. Market access remained 
restricted in several ways, and US successes again illustrated that it is generally easier to prevent changes 
in procedures than to make changes in the existing system. One highly visible success in this regard 
though was the sale of a $20 million CRAY supercomputer to NTT where CRAY was able to clearly 
outperform the Japanese entry on several important objective measures. 
Industrial Espionage: IBM Computer Sting 
 
In the early 1980s IBM dominated the computing world. Thus, in developing their own industry, Japanese 
producers followed a look-a-like strategy that emulated IBM software. However, as IBM kept moving the 
technology goal posts, there were tremendous competitive pressures on the Japanese producers such as 
Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric to keep up. 
 The Japanese government could not keep the main competitor out because IBM had had an 
operation in Japan prior to World War II. Thus, under the Occupation, IBM could return and it made the 
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most of this opportunity, establishing a strong and vibrant subsidiary. The best the Japanese government 
could do was to seek to control IBM’s market power through laws and regulations that limited the import 
of technology and which enabled it to force IBM to license its technology to Japanese producers. This 
proved a Pyrrhic victory though, because it meant diluting market shares of local producers in a high-
growth industry where the world leader was a major participant. That, in turn, meant no leading Japanese 
champion could emerge, thereby compounding the short- and long-term competitive pressures on 
Japanese producers.  
 The Japanese resorted to industrial espionage, which led to in a well-publicized and embarrassing 
sting. In June 1982, four employees of two prominent Japanese companies were arrested by the FBI in the 
United States for stealing IBM secrets (Pollack 1982, 1983).  
 The sting was clearly a big setback, but the Japanese simply shifted to a different approach: 




In 1984 MITI proposed a new software protection regime other than copyright that would be controlled 
by MITI. It would have much shorter protection limits than copyright and give MITI access to IBM’s 
proprietary technology. It was obviously supported by Japan’s major computer manufacturers such as 
Hitachi and Fujitsu, who wished to get out from under IBM’s effective monopoly of mainframe operating 
systems standards.  
 However, under Japanese Law the Ministry Of Education had responsibility for copyrights and 
wanted to retain this authority. Further, not all important electronics firms supported MITI’s initiative. 
Akio Morita of Sony, in particular, saw his company’s future in music and movies being threatened by 
the MITI proposal and indicated his agreement with US opposition to the scheme. MITI also was unable 
to generate support from other countries within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPRO), 
except for Korea. 
 MITI ultimately failed in achieving its goals for reasons similar to the US difficulties in opening 
certain Japanese industries to competitive imports. When there is an economically and politically 
powerful unified group supporting an existing regime, and there is no consensus on the side arguing for 
change, then change is extremely difficult to achieve. 
 
Selling Dual-Use Technologies 
During the Cold War the US government was very conscious of valuable technologies becoming 
available to communist regimes, especially Russia and China. While military technologies related to 
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armaments were clearly restricted, dual-use technologies applicable to both military and civilian use were 
also on a restricted list. These included computers, semiconductors, and jet engines. 
 Being on the restricted list of course made illicit trade in these products quite profitable. One 
illustration of this that was made public in the Japanese press involved fishing technology from Europe 
that could be used to identify schools of fish underwater but obviously could be used to track other 
underwater objects. Two employees of a major Japanese trading company decided to import this product 
under a European export license with the stated purpose of selling it to a Japanese fishing company.  
 However their real objective was a diversion to China. The US and Japanese governments 
discovered the scheme. The Japanese publicly arrested the executives and seized the equipment before it 
could be shipped. That is, instead of keeping it secret, the incident was used as a warning to Japanese 
firms considering selling their own dual-use technology products to China or Russia. 
 
Detergent And Paper Diaper Wars 
 
In the late 1970s Proctor & Gamble (P&G) entered the Japanese market with much fanfare through the 
purchase of a small Japanese company, Sunhome, in conjunction with the trading company C. Itoh. 
Concerned that this international consumer products giant would overwhelm Japanese competitors such 
as Kao and Lion, the Japanese government placed several conditions on P&G’s entry. As events 
developed, though, the Japanese government need not have worried. 
 Kao and Lion took advantage of their established distribution systems and a weak yen to 
underprice P&G’s laundry detergent, Cheer. Further, P&G’s traditional marketing strategy of couponing 
through newspapers was declared illegal as a form of gambling. By 1984 P&G was losing money in 
Japan at an alarming rate. P&G’s CEO sent its executive vice president for International activities, Edwin 
Artz, to Japan with instructions to stay until the competitive problem was resolved, which was not easy 
given Kao and Lion’s vastly better understanding of the Japanese housewife. 
 P&G ultimately sought and achieved an innovative non-market solution. Artz and a P&G lawyer 
arrived at the Commercial Counselor’s office proposing to use Japan’s Predatory Pricing Act to counter 
Kao and Lion’s aggressive pricing strategies. An artifact left over from the Occupation, the law had been 
translated from US statutes into Japanese. Still, it remained in force. The law made it illegal for a 
company to sell its products in Japan below cost with the express objective of driving a competitor out of 
business. 
 As this was clearly a sensitive and highly visible situation, the Commercial Counselor arranged a 
joint meeting with the responsible official at MITI. During this meeting it became apparent MITI did not 
want to implement the law, but recognized something needed to be done to defuse the conflict. MITI 
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would thus have discussions with the Japanese firms and work with the US to resolve the couponing and 
product promotion issues. In this way the situation was quietly resolved. Artz could return home after 
bringing in new management for the Japanese operation. He eventually became the CEO of P&G. 
 Importantly, the Japanese use of government guidance in this case resolved a commercial dispute 
quickly and efficiently, unlike the US where lengthy and expensive litigation would be much more likely. 
 Nevertheless it was clear that P&G’s standard approach to international expansion was far too 
simplistic in just replicating its US or UK operations in such a different cultural context as the Japanese 
market. This became apparent in the diaper wars that occurred about the same time. P&G invented the 
disposable paper diaper, Pampers, and successfully introduced them into Japan by distributing them free 
to major maternity hospitals. 
 But subsequently its Japanese market share dropped from 100% to 15% as Kao in particular 
introduced a product that not only was superior in all respects, but also showed far greater understanding 
of the Japanese housewife. Unlike Pampers, Kao put elastic around the bottom of the diapers so they 
would not leak and blue dots that changed color when the child had peed, thus alerting a mother as to 
when the diaper needed changing. P&G merely responded by lowering its price and couponing, but to no 
avail. It would then take several years and a revamping of its Japanese operations to stabilize and grow its 
Japanese business, an object lesson in corporate hubris. 
 
Banking, Financial, and Legal Services 
 
One aspect of the Chenery (export-led) growth model is that when lower growth arrives, the economy 
should be prepared to transition into a more consumer-service based economy. A key aspect of this 
economic evolution, which the Japanese and the US both clearly understood, is the importance of 
communications and software and their electronic support structure. This was the basis of the strategic 
clashes described above.  
 A key part of the transition is the industries that are the major users of the new technologies. 
Financial services and their legal and accounting support services thus loomed as critical to the 
development of a consumer-, information-, and service-led economy. As the large accounting firms such 
as Arthur Anderson and Price Waterhouse had been grandfathered since the Occupation, market opening 
negotiations focused on banking, investment banking, and brokerage, along with legal services.  
 Universal banks from Europe were seen as having an advantage compared to US banks, which 
were subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions on the range of services they could offer. The Occupation had 
instituted a similar separation of banking and security services in Japan. The large Japanese banks hoped 
to use international investment as a way around the restrictions. Everyone was jockeying for position, 
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while the regulatory environment became quite fluid. In the end US, Japanese, and European regulators 
let almost everyone into the competitive mix with unforeseen consequences. 
 One key decision was a regulatory opinion by the US Federal Reserve that Glass-Steagall only 
compelled the separation of commercial and investment banks in the United States and did not prevent a 
US bank from owning or participating in securities and investment banking activities in other countries. 
This set off a wave of purchases by US commercial banks of UK and Hong Kong securities firms that 
had, or had the right to open, offices in Japan. Because the UK was not burdened with defense-related 
considerations in negotiations, it had been very aggressive in demanding a quid pro quo from the 
Japanese when Japan’s major banks and securities companies wanted to open offices in London, the 
world’s major financial center. 
 These acquisitions were not cheap because, on top of the cost of buying or establishing a UK 
securities firm, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) required that the Japanese subsidiary be adequately 
capitalized and that it had a full staffing complement in terms of officers, compliance, and reporting 
personnel and traders. This not only kept headhunters busy, it gave second careers to Japanese bank and 
securities personnel nearing retirement. Demand for prestigious office space also increased dramatically. 
Indeed it was difficult to keep up with the opening of new securities operations. 
 The demand for related legal services also grew, and the expanding US and UK financial firms 
pressed their case that they needed in-country advice from their traditional lawyers. This was naturally 
something the Japanese legal profession aggressively resisted, abetted by US firms that had been founded 
by US lawyers during the Occupation such as Anderson, Mori & Rabinowitz. These firms were 
concerned that they would lose existing large clients operating in Japan and would be overwhelmed by 
the larger and better-financed US and UK law firms. A compromise was finally reached where large 
foreign law firms could apply to open two-person representative offices that would only be able to opine 
to their clients on international or foreign law. Further they were not allowed to hire Japanese lawyers or 
to merge with a Japanese law firm. 
 This arrangement lasted for a few years but, like the proverbial camel getting its nose under the 
tent, the large global firms eventually were allowed to merge with Japanese law firms or to hire Japanese 
lawyers, effectively becoming full-service branches. 
 The newly minted securities firms did not fair so well. By the time they got their operations under 
way, they were hit with the 1987 market crash, followed by the collapse of the Japanese stock and real 
estate markets in the first quarter of 1990. In addition, it had proved quite difficult to break down 
traditional Japanese banking and securities relationships. As a result, few of the new security operations 
made any money, even during the boom period. Though Japan ultimately became more open to big global 
financial service firms, many wrote off their security firm investments and began focusing on the next big 
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opportunities – the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the opening of China, and the huge surge in foreign direct 




Once a year, senior officials from the Economics section of the US State Department, along with senior 
officials from the Department of Commerce, would meet with their Japanese counterparts to discuss, and 
in some cases negotiate, the economic and commercial issues between the two countries. Given its 
heavily fish-based diet, one of the most important topics from the Japanese viewpoint was access to 
fishing rights within the US 200-mile economic zone, especially off the coast of Alaska. These 
negotiations covered a range of issues including the number of boats in the Japanese fishing fleet and the 
types and quantities of fish that could be caught. In 1984 these negotiations became extremely heated.  
 US fishing interests wanted access to Japan’s surimi technology, a product that looks and tastes 
(something) like Alaskan king crab. In addition, Congress had passed legislation that linked the granting 
of US fishing rights with specific limits on whaling, an issue that particularly targeted Norway and Japan. 
By linking access to critical US fishing areas with whaling, US environmental groups hoped to pressure 
Japan into limiting its whaling. The Japanese side was not happy about this because one specific 
community in Japan was totally economically dependent on whaling. At one point in the discussions, a 
Japanese vice minister stated that if the US persisted in linking fishing rights and whaling, it could 
jeopardize the entire US-Japan relationship including defense. While it was recognized this was rhetoric 
for public consumption, it was still a shock to hear such a statement given that Prime Minister Nakasone 
had not long before referred to Japan as the US’s giant aircraft carrier. 
 The US ultimately got the surimi technology, and the Japanese continued whaling but for 




While the above scenarios are by no means comprehensive in terms of the commercially related 
controversies between the US and Japan during the 1980s and later, they do reflect the scope and various 
nuances that arose. Importantly, they have echoes in current trade and investment disputes with China that 
also are taking place within a complex of larger diplomatic and military interests. Perhaps the successes 
and failures of the processes described above will be useful in addressing similar issues when they arise in 
another time and place. That they no longer are issues with respect to Japan should be a caution that as 
economies change, so can related economic and political tensions. 
  20 
 
 
Appendix: Invisible Barriers to Trade Remaining in the Late 1980s 
 
Given the number of available examples, there are, commensurately, a large number of detailed studies of 
the complaints of foreign businesses in Japan dating from the 1980s. The result of this increased 
transparency of trade barriers, combined with pressure from foreign governments, did lead to the 
reduction and elimination of some of the practices. However, several remained in the mid 80s when my 
time as Commercial Counselor ended. They are outlined below by both general area and specific industry. 
More detail is included in the reports cited.  
 There has been no attempt to eliminate overlap among categories. When the same problem 
appears in more than one sector, it indicates a particularly difficult problem for an industry specifically 
and for several products generally. Barriers to investment are included with trade barriers, as investment 
is considered a key contributor to facilitating imports into Japan and to improving a firm's competitive 
position. 
 Barriers such as language or the distribution system are mentioned only when government action 
could ameliorate the situation. Otherwise they are innate to Japan’s business environment and just have to 
be dealt with. 




Japan passed 16 laws in May 1983 to permit more foreign participation in the standards-setting process, 
and it seems to comply with international procedures on prior notification in creating or revising 
standards. However, ministries still did not have a procedure for accepting foreign test data in many areas, 
including industrial standards, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment. Only two US firms had been 
designated as foreign testing organizations, and none could do the initial tests for JIS [Japanese Industrial 
Standards similar to US UL or Underwriters Laboratories] marks. Self-certification also remains elusive, 
particularly in areas such as automobiles. Thus, five years after this problem was first raised as a non-
tariff barrier, and two years after the laws were passed to achieve needed changes and a Japanese cabinet 
level commission recommended significant, if not sweeping changes, there still had been very little 
effective implementation of improvement.  
 In areas such as telecommunications, foreign firms still had not been granted access to the 
ministry's deliberative council in which standards are discussed and set, even though Japanese law 
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required such participation. Thus standards issues remained an important impediment to increased 




The problem of uplifting assessment valuations in related-company transactions (transactions in which 
goods move between company offices) is one of raised duties and discouraged imports. Similarly, costly 
clearance delays could be significantly reduced by permitting the increased use of bonded warehouses, 
publishing clear customs procedures, allowing goods to clear customs on bond with subsequent settling of 
duty payments, eliminating various permit systems, and clarifying the fees involved. Also, there is no 
customs duty-drawback provision when a product is re-exported. 
 
Establishment of a transparent import-licensing code 
 
Japan had not taken action to comply with or implement such a code despite provisions in the amended 
1980 Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law. Import restrictions still were being added or deleted by 
administrative guidance, and import quota allocations were not transparent. Thus, all applicants did not 
have an equal chance to compete. As some quotas were not fully utilized, this was an area of some 




Japan conformed to the letter of the GATT code, especially in establishing transparent procedures for 
government procurement. However, the extensive, almost exclusive, use of sole-source tendering (which 
was originally intended for exceptional circumstances) almost vitiated the code's intent in terms of 
opening the Japanese government-procurement market. In addition, some administrative obstacles 
remained, such as the 30-day notice period, which is the GATT minimum, and Japanese maximum, 




Inventions, brand names, corporate symbols, product styling, proprietary know-how, and so on are highly 
valuable assets to any corporation. They are often the only entry advantage to a potential foreign importer 
or investor. This means protecting that advantage becomes a critical part of any market-entry or market-
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development strategy. Therefore, the net impact of Japan's administration, laws, and procedures in the 
area of patents, trademarks, and copyrights has a material and, unfortunately, generally adverse impact on 
foreign firms' competitive position in Japan.  
 The large number of applications combined with the Patent Office's limited resources to create 
the biggest problem concerning intellectual property. There were four times as many patent filings as in 
the US, and applications could take four to six years to be processed.  
 Patent applications are open for public inspection after 18 months, and the patent period runs 
from the application date. The ability of Japanese firms (often those seeking to develop a similar 
technology) to borrow the patent file opens an applicant to potential technology loss during the critical 
initial market development period. Further, the Japanese firms can delay the patent through objections. 
This situation discourages both trade and investment. 
 The Japan Patent Office also did not offer foreign firms sufficient time to file applications based 
on their overseas patents, given the problems of translation. Further, the Patent Office rejected 
applications for minor errors of commission or omission rather than granting an extension to revise the 
application. 
 Trademarks offer a similar area of concern, given long delays, the ability of Japanese firms to 
register foreign trademarks in Japan, and the difficulty in renewal if minor changes have been made. Also, 
Japan's trademark protection did not extend to service marks. And there was no protection in Japan for 
trade secrets or industrial know-how.  




These discounts are a specialized form of market promotion aided by a provision in the tax code that 
permitted the difference between a product's list price and its sale price to an educational institution to be 
deducted for tax purposes. Depending on the list price and a company's marginal tax rate, the practice 
allowed a firm to sell at a profit due to an effective tax subsidy, even when the discounted sale price was 
below cost. 
 The Ministry of Education often used the existence of academic discounts to justify sole-source 
tenders, even though the source of the discount was from government funds via reduced tax revenues. As 
local earnings are needed to take advantage of the tax provision, and the pool is limited to a percentage of 
earnings, the effect was to favor large Japanese companies at the expense of importers. This discount was 
an especially important advantage in selling such items as super-computers and expensive medical 
equipment to university laboratories and hospitals. Such sales in turn helped establish a strong market 
  23 




Industry-specific measures affecting foreign sales of goods and services are often, but not always, 
involved in issues of industrial policy. In these cases, market-opening measures become intertwined with 
issues of fairness, long-term government objectives, and targeting changes in comparative advantage. I 
endeavor to distinguish in the following list between those areas where barriers are considered part of 
Japan's industrial policy objectives at the time (marked with an *) and areas where barriers are more the 
result of historical accident. 
 
*1.Agricultural chemicals: See reports 3 and 7. 
*2.Automobiles: See reports 2, 5, and 7. 
 3.Banking and securities: See reports 2, 3, 5, and 7. 
*4.Biotechnology: See report 7. 
* 5.Chemicals: See reports 2, 3, and 7. 
* 6.Computers and software: See reports 1 and 7. 
  7.Construction/ engineering firms: See reports 2 and 3. 
  8.Cosmetics: See reports 3, 5, and 7. 
*9.Depressed industries: See reports 1 and 7. 
*10.Energy: See reports 2 and 3. 
 11.Food products: See reports 5 and 7. 
*12Forest products: See reports 5 and 7. 18.  
 13.Insurance: See reports 2, 3, and 7. 
 14.Legal services: See reports 3 and 7. 
*15.Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment: See reports 2, 3, and 7. 
 16.Publishing: See reports 2, 3, and 7. 
*17.Semiconductors: See reports 1 and 7. 
*18.Telecommunications products and services: See reports 1, 3, and 7. 
  19.Tobacco products: See reports 5 and 7. 
  20.Transportation: See reports 2, 3, and 7. 
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